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THE DRUNKEN DRIVER AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A
SURVEY OF THE CASE LAW AND THE FEASIBILITY OF
A PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IN NORTH DAKOTA

I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade approximately 25,000 people have died each
year as a result of automobile accidents involving drunken drivers. 1
The legislative response to these staggering figures has taken a

variety of forms. Mandatory jail sentences, 2 revocation or

suspension of driver's licenses, 3 higher fines, 4 and mandatory
rehabilitation programs 5 are examples of some current penalties for

driving while intoxicated. 6 While state legislatures are imposing

1. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 13, 52 (1982) (number of motor vehicle
deaths in the last ten years averages more than 50,000 deaths each year; half of these deaths are
attributable to drunken drivers).
2. See Note, CriminalLaw - MandatoryJail Sentences: An Effective Solution to the Drunk Driver Crisis?
Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.515, (1979). 55 WASH. L. REv. 677 (1979).
3. See Drexler. California's New Drunk Driving Lau. 5 L.A. LAW.. Mar. 1982. at 34. 36:
Hammer, The New OMVWI Law: Wisconsin Changes Its Approach to the Problem of Drinking and Driving,
55 Wis. B. BULL.. Apr. 1982, at 9: Hammer, The New OMVWILaw: Wisconsin Changes Its Approach to
the Problem qfDrinking and Driving, 55 Wis. B. BULL., May 1982, at 15.
4. See Walta. Review of New Legislation Relating to CriminalLaw, 11 COLO. LAw. 2148, 2160-61
(1982).
5. See Cameron. The Impact qf Drinking-Driving Countermeasures: A Review and Evaluation, 8
CONTENIP. DRL PROBs. 495. 525-27 (1979).
6. See generally Winter. States Get Tougher on Drunk Drivers. 68 A.B.A. J. 140 (1982) (more severe
sanctions against drunken driving went into eltk-ct on january 1. 1982. in California and Illinois):
Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law. 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660. 1674-81 (1981) (presents and evaluates
various programs to deter drunken driving).
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more severe criminal penalties upon those who drink and drive, the
victims of drunken drivers are also venting their anger by
requesting punitive damages in tort claims against intoxicated
7
drivers.
Presently, twenty-one jurisdictions favor imposition of
punitive damages against an intoxicated driver who causes
personal injury to another person. 8 A minority of nine jurisdictions
refuse to award punitive damages in a drunken driver case. 9
Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to award
punitive damages in a recent case, 10 the legislature subsequently
enacted legislation allowing double damages under certain
circumstances. 11 The remaining jurisdictions have not addressed
the issue.
This Note discusses the historical background and theoretical
foundation of punitive damages and also analyzes the cases
involving drunken drivers in which courts have awarded or denied
punitive damages. The courts vary substantially in what is
necessary to support an award. 12 Some courts have assessed
7. See Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REy. 117 (1980). See
generally 65 A.L.R. 3D 656 (1975) (discussion of the case law on punitive damages and drunken
drivers).
8. The following states allow punitive damages for injuries caused by an intoxicated driver:
Alabama (see Fritz v. Salva, 406 So. 2d 884 (Ala. 1981)); Arizona (see Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274
P. 639 (1929)); Arkansas (see Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948)); California
(see Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979)); Colorado
(see Mince v. Butters, 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980)); Connecticut (see Infeld v. Sullivan, 151
Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964)); Delaware (see Walczak v. Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971)); Florida (see Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976)); Georgia (see Chitwood v. Stoner, 60
Ga. App. 599, 4 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1939)); Illinois (see Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564, 153
N.E.2d 90 (App. Ct. 1958)); Iowa (see Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954));
Kentucky (see Wigginton's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933 (1920)); Mississippi (see
Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So. 2d 572 (1951)); Missouri (see Smith v.
Sayles, 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)); Montana (see Allers v. Willis,
Mont.
-, 643
P.2d 592 (1982)); New Mexico (see Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971)); New
York, (see Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Civ. Ct. 1973)); Ohio (see Payne v.
Daley, 51 Ohio Misc. 65, 367 N.E.2d 75 (C.P. 1977)); Oregon (see Dorn v. Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236,
458 P.2d 942 (1969)); Pennsylvania (see Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (Super.
Ct. 1970)); Tennessee (see Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1945)).
Although the Wisconsin courts have not addressed the issue of punitive damages and drunken
drivers, an award may be allowed in that state. See Durham v. Pekrul, 104 Wis. 2d 339, 311 N.W.2d
615 (1981) (punitive damages allowed for conduct equivalent to gross negligence); Ayala v. Farmers
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956) (intoxication and negligence on the
highway constitutes gross negligence).
9. The following jurisdictions deny punitive damage awards: Alaska (see Nisson v. Hobbs, 417
P.2d 250 (Alaska 1966)); Indiana (see Thompson v. Pickle, 136 Ind. App. 139, 191 N.E.2d 53 (Ct.
App. 1963)); Kansas (see Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954)); Maryland (see
Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944)); Michigan (see McLaren v. Zeilinger, 103 Mich.
App. 22, 302 N.W.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1981)); North Carolina (see Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327,
174 S.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1970)); Oklahoma (see Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247 P.2d 964
(1952)); Texas (see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)); Virginia
(see Baker v. Markus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960)).
10. Johnsen v. Fernald, 120 N.H. 440, 416 A.2d 1367 (1980).
11. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 265-89(a) (1982).
12. Compare Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976) (act of drinking and driving itself
supports a finding of recklessness in Florida) with Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564, 153
N.E.2d 90 (App. Ct. 1958) (plaintiff must show specific facts alleging recklessness).
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punitive damages against a driver based solely on his or her
voluntary drunkenness; 13 other courts have imposed very stringent
proof requirements on the plaintiff. 14 In all cases, however, the
courts focus on the act of driving while intoxicated as a basis for an
award of punitive damages. 15 Finally, this Note will discuss the
application of appropriate North Dakota laws to determine the
feasibility of awarding punitive damages against a drunken driver
in North Dakota.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE THEORY, PURPOSE, AND
REQUIREMENTS
The first award of punitive damages in a drunken driver case
was upheld by a Kentucky court in 1920.16 The theory underlying
punitive damage awards, however, dates back several thousand
centuries. 17 Early laws required that thieves repay their victims in
quantities several times greater than the amount of goods stolen.18
This form of restitution overcompensated the victim and resulted in
an economic punishment or penalty to the thief.19 Although
punitive damages are no longer awarded for mere theft, the theory
20
of punishment persists today in punitive damage awards.
A. HISTORY
As early as 2000 B.C., The Code of Hammurabidescribed a form
of punitive damages. 21 The Babylonian laws of restitution
provided: "If a man steal an ox, or sheep, or ass, or pig, or boat,
from a temple or palace, he shall pay thirty-fold; if it be from a
freeman, he shall pay tenfold." ' 22 Hittite law from the fourteenth
century B.C. similarly allowed a multiple recovery for theft. 23 Early
13.
14.
15.
16.

See, e.g., Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973).
See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
See K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.2, at 79 (1980).
Wigginton's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650,657, 217 S.W. 933, 936 (1920).

17. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
18. E.g., THE CODE OF HAMMURABI § 8, reprinted in A. KOCOUREK &J.
ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAW 391 (1915).

WIGMORE, SOURCES OF

19. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
20. Seegenerally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205-06 (1973) (general
discussion of the purposes and theories underlying punitive damage awards).

21. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, supra note 18, at 387-442. See also Belli, Punitive Damages: Their
History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-DaySociety, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1980) (historical
development of punitive damages); Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 117, 121-23 (1980) (general discussion of the history of punitive damages). See generally K.
REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2, at 23-46 (1980) (analysis of punitive damages, including history,
policy, purpose, and an analysis of each state's laws and policies).
22. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, supra note 18, §8, at 391.
23. J. SMITH, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREW LAW 246 (1960).
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Hebrew, 24 Roman, 25 and Hindu 26 laws also provided for
punishment that resembled a punitive damage award.,
The English common law courts did not recognize punitive
damages until the Huckle v. Money case in 1763.27 In Huckle the
28
English court characterized the award as exemplary damages.
Twenty-seven years later, a New Jersey court became the first
American court to instruct a jury in awarding exemplary damages
for a breach of a promise to marry. 29 In 1851 the United States
Supreme Court in Day v. Woodworth3 recognized punitive damages
31
as an established common law principle.
B. PURPOSE
The Code of Hammurabi and other early forms of punitive
damage awards indicate that those laws were intended to punish
wrongdoers. 32 As in these early applications of punitive or
exemplary damages, the present purpose of the award is to punish
wrongdoers for their outrageous conduct 33 and to deter them from
24. A. KOCOUREK &J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, at 391. The Hebrew laws, written in the seventh

century B.C., are known as the Pentateuch and are located in the first five chapters of the Bible. The
verses that address punitive damages state: "If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep, and kill it, or sell
it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep ....
If the theft be found in his hand
alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or sheep, he shall pay double." Exodus 22:1, :4.
25. THE TWELVE TABLES, reprinted in A. KOCOUREK & J. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND
PRIMITIVE LAW 465 (1915). The Twelve Tables were enacted in 450 B.C. Id. n.1.
26. THE LAWS OF MANU, reprinted in A. KOCOUREK & J. WIOMORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND
PRIMITIVE LAW 469 (1915). This Hindu code is believed to date about 200 B.C. Many of the laws
contained in the code, however, are probably much older. Id. n. 1.
27. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). See generally 1 T. SEDOWICK, SEDOWICK ON THE MEASURE OF
DAMAGES §5 347-352 (rev. 9th ed. 1913) (early history of punitive damages in England and the
United States).
28. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768-69 (K.B. 1763). Lord Camden stated:
The personal injury done to [the plaintiff] was very small, so that if the jury had been
confined by their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps [f120 ...
damages would have been thought damages sufficient; but the small injury done to the
plaintiff.., did not appear to thejury in that striking light... ; they saw a magistrate
over all the King's subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and
attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom ....
These are the ideas which struck
the jury on the trial; and I think they have done right in giving exemplary damages.
Id.
29. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 NJ.L. 90, 91 (1790). Seegenerally I G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 396-400 (1893) (discusses punitive damages in several American states).
30. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
31. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). The Court held:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and
all actions on the case for torts, ajury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive,
or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence
rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.
Id.

32. Id. at 370. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). Section 908 defines punitive damages as
follows:
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performing similar acts in the future. 34 An award also is designed to
35
discourage and deter others from engaging in such conduct.
for
Courts do not award punitive damages to compensate victims
36
their injuries, but rather to punish and deter wrongdoers.
C. POLICY DEBATE
Although courts clearly have espoused the purpose of punitive
damages,3 7 whether an award actually accomplishes its purpose is
unclear. 38 Critics argue that punitive damages do not effectively
deter the wrongdoer or others39 and that the award is a windfall to
the plaintiff.40 Another criticism is that the award is left to the
caprice of the jury. 41 Further, although the doctrine is criminal in
nature, it fails to grant any procedural safeguards, such as the
privilege against self-incrimination or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 42 Critics also have argued that punitive damages are a form
of double jeopardy because the defendant may be subject to both
civil and criminal penalties. 43 The United States Supreme Court
in Day v. Woodworth, 44 however, upheld the constitutionality of
punitive damages.4 5 Another criticism of punitive damages focuses
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter
him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In
assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of
the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the
defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser
states that "[s]uch damages are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for his
injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching him not to do it again, and of
deterring others from following his example." Id.
37. See, e.g., Mince v. Butters, 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980); Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill.
App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (App. Ct. 1958).
38. For a discussion of the merits of punitive damages, see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIS § 3.9, at 219-21 (1973); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77, at
275-78 (1935); W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 2, at 11; Belli, supra note 21, at 5-8; Mallor & Roberts,
Punitive Damages: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 642-50 (1980); Morris, Punitive
Damagesin Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1176-88 (1931); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517,520-26 (1956); Comment, supra note 21, at 128.
39. E.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 220; Comment, supra note 21, at 128.
40. E.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 219; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 77, at 276; W.
PROSSER, supra note 36, § 2, at 11; Comment, supra note 21, at 131.
41. D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 219.
42. D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 219; W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 2, at 11; Comment,
supra note 21, at 130.
43. D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 219; W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 2. at 11; Comment,
supra note 21, at 130.
44.54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
45. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 373 (1851).
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upon the insurability of the award. 4 6
The argument supporting punitive damages emphasizes
punishing the defendant4 7 and the deterrent nature of the award. 48
Furthermore, proponents of the doctrine argue that the award is
not a windfall to the plaintiff because it compensates the victim for
the actual expenses of litigation and attorney's fees. 49 Other
arguments advanced in support of the doctrine are that the jury.
should be allowed to vent its anger when the conduct of the
wrongdoer is outrageous5 0 and that the award prevents lawless self5
help. '
Whether the doctrine of punitive damages accomplishes its
intended purposes of deterrence and punishment is a debate that is
likely to continue, particularly when awards are granted in such
controversial cases as those involving drunken drivers. Although
critics have attacked the effectiveness of the award, the courts have
firmly established the type of conduct that will support an award.
D. CONDUCT

The type of conduct that justifies an award of punitive
damages is an act that is committed with an evil motive or with
reckless indifference to the rights or safety of others. 52 An evil
motive may include a defendant's hatred or ill will toward another
54
person, 53 while recklessness is a careless or indifferent attitude.
Both types of conduct contain elements of outrage 55 similar to
46. For a discussion of the insurability of punitive damages, see D. DOBBS, supra note 38, 5 3.9,
at 216-17; Conley & Bishop, Punitive Damage and the General Liability Insurance Policy, 25 FED'N INS.
COuNS. Q. 309 (1975); Scheil, Punitive Damage Awards: The InsuranceIndustry is Placedon Notice, 45 INS.
COUNS. J. 350 (1978); Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1978); Zuger,
Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 53 N.D.L. REv. 239 (1978); Note, Insurancefor PunitiveDamages:
A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 431 (1976); Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117 (1980).
47. See Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A CriticalAnalysis: Kirk v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REv.
369, 383 (1965-1966); Comment, supra note 21, at 128.
48. See Walther & Plein, supra note 47, at 382-83.
49. D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 220; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 77, at 277; W.
PROSSER, supra note 36, 5 2, at 11; Comment, supra note 21, at 129-30.
50. D. DOBBS, supra note 38, 5 3.9, at 220.
51. D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 205; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 77, at 277;
Comment, supra note 21, at 129.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (2) (1979).

53. Id. An evil motive implies express malice, which is defined as "ill will or wrongful motive. A
deliberate intention to commit an injury." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed. 1979). The
distinction between express and implied or inferred malice appears necessary in drunken driver cases
because the intoxicated driver probably has no hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 908 (1979). Recklessness is akin to implied malice,
which is defined as "[m]alice inferred by legal reasoning and necessary deduction from the resgestae
or the conduct of the party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 863 (5th ed. 1979).

55. W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 2, at 9-10. Dean Prosser states, "There must be circumstances
of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the
defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may
be called wilful or wanton." Id. (footnotes omitted.)
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conduct that would require imposition of criminal sanctions.5 6 The
variety of terms that courts use to describe an evil motive or
recklessness include malicious, wicked, oppressive, wanton, and
morally culpable . 7 Regardless of the terminology courts use to
describe the conduct, proving an evil motive or recklessness
involves an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind.5 8 To prove
that a defendant's act was wanton, wilful, or reckless 59 the plaintiff
must show the actor knew, or should have known, that a high
degree of risk of harm would follow from his actions . 6 0 The plaintiff
must show that the defendant deliberately acted or failed to act in
conscious disregard of that risk or with reckless indifference to that
61
risk.
The defendant, however, need not understand the potentially
harmful nature of his or her conduct. 62 If a reasonable person in the
actor's position would recognize the harm that could follow from
the act, courts will hold the wrongdoer to the standard of a
63
reasonable person.

The plaintiff must establish the requisite state of mind of the
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979). The comment to § 908 states
that "[t]hese damages can be awarded only for conduct for which this remedy is appropriate which is to say, conduct involving some element of outrage similar to that usually found in crime."
Id.
57. D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 205. Professor Dobbs concluded that "[s]ince all of these
words refer to the same underlying culpable state of mind . . . almost any term that describes
misconduct coupled with a bad state of mind will describe the case for a punitive award." Id.
58. D. DOBBS, supranote 38, § 3.9, at 205. Professor Dobbs notes, "It is usually the defendant's
mental state that is said to justify a punitive award against him, rather than his outward conduct."
Id.
59. See W. PROSSER, supranote 36, § 34, at 185. Dean Prosser explains:
The usual meaning assigned to "wilful," "wanton," or "reckless," according to
taste as to the word used, is that the actor has intentionally done an act of an
unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must
be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm
would follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to the
consequences ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 500 (1979). Section 500 defines reckless disregard of
safety, often called wanton or wilful misconduct, as follows:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or
intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such
risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Id.
61. Id. § 500 comment b. The Restatment (Second) of Torts discusses two types of reckless
conduct: first, the actor knows of facts which create a high risk of harm; second, the actor has
knowledge, or reason to know of such facts, but fails to appreciate the risk involved, even though a
reasonable person would recognize the risk. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The tortfeasor, regardless of his or her actual understanding of the potential harm, is
held to the objective standard of the reasonable person. Id.
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defendant to recover punitive damages. 64 Mistake, error of
judgment, and inadvertence will not support an award. 65 The
plaintiff also must establish facts that will support his or her claim
damages in the
for injuries because courts will not award punitive
66
absence of compensatory or nominal damages.
In the following cases involving drunken drivers and punitive
damages, courts vary substantially in their analyses of the problem.
Some courts require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's state
of mind was reckless, while other courts presume that drinking and
driving is a reckless act. 67 The terminology describing the
defendant's conduct also varies from state to state. 68 In all these
cases, however, the courts have focused on whether the act of
drinking and driving is sufficiently outrageous to support an award
of punitive damages.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
A.

EARLY CASES

In 1920 the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the issue of
drunken drivers and punitive damages in Wigginton 's Administrator
v. Rickert. 69 In that case the defendant and his companions were
drinking in several saloons for a period of two to three hours prior
to the accident. 70 While on their way to another saloon, Wigginton
hit a streetcar at a speed of forty-five miles per hour. 71 Two
passengers in the streetcar were injured and brought an action
against Wigginton's estate. 72 The jury awarded $4000 in punitive
damages.

73

64. See D. DOBBS, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 205. See also Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506, 199
A.2d 693 (1964) (rejected defendant's claim that driving under the influence could not be wanton
misconduct because intoxication precludes necessary state ofmind).
65. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 comment b (1979) (ordinary negligence will not
support an award of punitive damages).
66. Id. § 908 comment c. The comment to § 908 states, "It is essential . . . that facts be
established, that apart from punitive damages, are sufficient to maintain a cause of action." Id.
67. CompareTaylorv. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979)
(plaintiff must prove that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of
drinking and driving) with Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976) (court presumed that the act
of driving while intoxicated was sufficiently reckless to support an award of punitive damages).
68. See D. DoBas, supra note 38, § 3.9, at 205.
69. 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933 (1920).
70. Wigginton's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 651, 217 S.W. 933, 934 (1920).
71. Id. at 651, 217 S.W. at 933-34. Wigginton and a fellow passenger were killed. Two
occupants in the car survived and testified that the car was traveling at a speed of 12-15 miles per
hour. Four other witnesses estimated the speed at 40-45 miles per hour. Id.
72. Id. at 652, 217 S.W. at 933. Mrs. Rickert and her daughter were not seated on the side of the
streetcar that was stuck. The impact of the collision, however, threw Mrs. Rickert and her daughter
against the window. Id. at 934.
73. Id. at 655, 217 S.W. at 935. The jury awarded $100 for medical expenses and $300 for lost
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On appeal Wigginton's administrator challenged the
admissibility of the evidence concerning the defendant's
intoxication.7 4 The court, however, stated that this evidence was
relevant to the issues of speed and recklessness because:
[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that persons under
the influence of liquor are wholly unfit to operate
automobiles ... they have no thought of their own safety,
and appear to be wholly possessed of a desire to run the
machine as fast as it can go, without any regard to the
rights of other people. .... 75
The court concluded that this action was an appropriate case for
punitive damages because Wigginton's wanton and reckless
76
conduct caused the accident.
Nine years later the Arizona Supreme Court awarded punitive
damages against a drunken driver in Ross v. Clark. 77 In granting the
award, the court emphasized the deterrent nature of punitive
damages. 78 The Clarks were traveling to a celebration during late
afternoon heavy traffic. 79 A taxicab crossed the centerline and
struck their car at a speed of fifty to sixty miles per hour.80 Mrs.
Clark was thrown through the windshield of the car and sustained
serious injuries.8 1 The evidence showed that the taxicab driver was
82
intoxicated at the time of the accident.
The court found that defendant Ross drove at a reckless and
uncontrollable speed under circumstances that demanded careful
driving. 83 Because the injury was serious and because the
defendant displayed a reckless and wilful disregard for human life,
84
the court found that punitive damages were appropriate.
Although the court considered $3000 in punitive damages a large
award, it found that the award constituted a "just and wholesome"
wages. Id.
74. Id. at 652, 217 S.W. at 934. The administrator argued that evidence of the number of drinks
consumed was too remote and prejudicial. Id.
75. Id. at 653, 217 S.W. at 934. The court held that the evidence of intoxication was
permissible. Id.
76. Id. at 655, 217 S.W. at 934. The court stated, "[W]e find the injury serious, and the cause
such negligence as indicated a reckless and wilful disregard of human life ... " Id. at 936,
77.35 Ariz. 60, __,
274 P. 639, 642 (1929).
78. Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60,-.., 274 P. 639, 642 (1929).
79. Id. at-.,
274 P. at 640.
80. Id. The taxicab driver apparently lost control of his vehicle. Id.

81. Id. Mr. Clark sustained injury to his chest and lungs. Id.
82. Id. at -,

274 P. at 642. Several passengers testified that the driver smelled strongly of

alcohol. Id.
83. Id. The court stated that careful driving was important due to heavy traffic. Id.

84. Id.
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example and warning to other intoxicated drivers. 8 5
Wigginton and Ross are the forerunners of cases in which courts
award punitive damages against intoxicated drivers. Evolving case
law has developed three categories of punitive damage cases. In the
first group of cases courts recognize that the act of drinking and
driving is sufficiently reckless to warrant an award. 8 6 In this group
the plaintiff need only show that the driver was intoxicated and that
an accident occurred. 87 The courts require little or no evidence of
reckless or careless driving.88 The mere fact that the defendant
voluntarily rendered himself intoxicated will support an award. 89
In the second category of cases courts require that the plaintiff
show facts establishing reckless conduct beyond the fact that the
defendant was intoxicated.9 0 In these cases the courts impose a
heavier burden of proof upon the plaintiff by demanding specific
facts establishing recklessness, proof of causation, or proof of the
defendant's state of mind. 9 1
The final category includes those cases in which courts have
denied punitive damage awards. 9 2 These courts do not agree on the
reasons for denying the awards.9 3 In many instances, however, the
injuries to the plaintiff were minor and the degree of the
94
defendant's intoxication minimal.
A final observation of the case law illustrates the willingness of
courts to award punitive damages. Courts that recognize voluntary
intoxication and driving as a reckless act without other proof
indicate their intolerance for drunken driving.9 5 Similarly, other
courts acknowledge the need for punishment of the drunken driver
while imposing safeguards insuring that the plaintiff prove his or
96
her case.
85. Id. The court upheld the punitive damage award, but reduced the actual damages by $5000.
Id.

86. See supra notes 72-85 and infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
87. E.g., Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1976).
88. Id. (Florida courts do not require proofofcareless or abnormal driving).

89. Id. (driving while intoxicated is a reckless act that supports an award of punitive damages).
90. See infra notes 99-184 and accompanying test.
91. E.g., Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 374, 565 P.2d 880 (Ct. App.), vacated, 115 Ariz. 211,

564 P.2d 900 (1977) (plaintiff must prove causation); Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598
P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) (plaintiff must prove defendant's state of mind); Madison v.
Wigal. 18 111. App. 2d 564. 153 N.E.2d 90 (App. Ct. 1958) (plaintiffnmust prove recklessness).

92. See infra notes 226-42 and accompanying text.
93. CompareJohnsenv. Fernald, 120 N.H. 440, 416 A.2d 1367 (1980) (driving while intoxicated
is not actual malice) with McLaren v. Zeilinger, 103 Mich. App. 22, 302 N.W.2d 583 (Ct. App.
1981) (punitive damages not allowed in automobile accident cases).
94. E.g., Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
95. E.g., Ingram, 340 So. 2d at 924. The Florida Supreme Court stated that "drunk drivers,

menace the public safety and are to be discouraged by punishment." Id.

96. See, e.g.. Taylor v. Superior Court. 24 Cal. 3d 890. 598 P.2d 854. 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979)

(plaintiff must prove defendant knew his act was dangerous).

1

1983]
B.
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NOTE

VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION:

A

PRESUMPTION OF MALICE

Nearly twenty years after the Ross decision, the Arkansas
Supreme Court faced the same punitive damages issue in Miller v.
Blanton. 97 The Miller court was the first to identify a defendant's
conduct as voluntary drunkenness. 98 Generally, Arkansas courts
award punitive damages when the plaintiff proves malice or
wilfulness. 99 In the absence of these findings, "wanton disregard of
the rights and safety of others" will support an award. 100
In Miller the defendant admitted that he was "half-drunk"
after consuming four or five highballs and that he was driving on
the wrong side of the road. 101 The court stated, "[Miller] knew that
he was taking into his stomach a substance that would stupefy his
senses, [and] retard his muscular and nervous reaction. .

.

. After

Miller voluntarily rendered himself unfit to operate a car properly
he undertook to drive his automobile . . . down a well traveled
highway." 102
The court emphasized that the consumption of intoxicating
liquor precluded the physical control necessary for safe driving. 103
a finding of
This conduct was sufficiently antisocial to warrant
04
wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others.1
In addition to Arkansas, a showing of voluntary intoxication
will provide the basis for an award of punitive damages in
Florida, 10 5 Iowa, 10 6 New Mexico, 10 7 New York, 10 8 Ohio, 10 9 and
Oregon. 110 For example, courts have held that the act of drinking
and driving itself will support a finding of reckless indifference to
97. 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948).
210 S.W.2d 293, 295 (1948). The court did not
98. Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, -,
specifically define voluntary intoxication; the court, however, described the effect of Miller's
intoxication and concluded that he voluntarily rendered himself unfit to operate an automobile. Id.
210 S.W.2d at 294-95.
at-,
99. Id. at-., 210 S.W.2d at 294.
100. Id.
101. Id. Miller also pleaded guilty to a charge of reckless driving. Id.
102. Id. at -. , 210 S.W.2d at 294-95. The court described the automobile as a "potentially
lethal machine." Id. at -, 210 S.W.2d at 295.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Ingram, 340 So. 2d at 924, cited with approvalin Nales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
398 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also Note, Negligent Intoxicated Driver Liable for
PunitiveDamages Without ProofofAbnormal or Reckless Driving, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 221 (1978).
106. See Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 106, 66 N.W.2d 841, 848 (1954), cited with approval in
Nichols v. Hocke, 297 N.W.2d 205, 205 (Iowa 1980).
107. SeeSvejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739,-, 487 P.2d 167, 168 (1971).
108. See Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, -, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
109. See Payne v. Daley, 51 Ohio Misc. 65,-, 367 N.E.2d 75, 78 (C.P. 1977).
110, See Dorn v. Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, -_, 458 P.2d 942, 945 (1969), cited with approval in
Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183,-__, 508 P.2d 211,213 (1973).
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the rights and safety of others11 1 or wilful and wanton negligence.1 12
In Florida "the voluntary act of driving 'while intoxicated'
evinces, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude for a jury to
be asked to provide an award of punitive damages." 1 13 Evidence of
carelessness or abnormal driving is not necessary in Florida. 114 The
plaintiff, however, must prove proximate cause and an underlying
award of compensatory damages before a court will award punitive
damages. 115 In Svejcara v. Whitman 16 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that evidence of guilty pleas to charges of reckless
driving and driving while intoxicated is sufficient evidence to
support an award of punitive damages. 117
In the Oregon case of Dorn v. Wilmarth, 118 the defendant
consumed about ten highballs; he failed to recall leaving the bar
and crashing through the plaintiffs bedroom wall with his
automobile. 119 The Dorn court held that the "conduct of one who
drives a car after voluntarily drinking to excess is best classified as
wanton or reckless.' 120 The court emphasized that the deterrent
nature of punitive damages justified the award. 12 1
In the cases in which courts presume that the voluntary act of
drinking and driving is reckless, the plaintiff is relieved from the
burden of proving recklessness or wantonness. 12 2 The plaintiff,
however, must still prove the other elements of his or her case, such
123
as proximate cause or compensatory damages.
111. See, e.g., Payne v. Daley, 51 Ohio Misc. at -, 367 N.E.2d at 78. The court noted, "It
seems impossible to argue today that the reasonable man (or woman) does not know that by drinking
and driving the chances of causing injury to others is greatly increased." Id.
112. See, e.g., Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d at -, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The court found the
moral culpability of such conduct overwhelming. Id.
113. Ingram, 340 So. 2d at 924 (court emphasizes that drunk drivers are a menace to public
safety).
114. Id. at 925. The Ingram court stated, "Driving in an intoxicated condition is an intentional
act which creates known risks to the public." Id.
115. Id. at 924. The plaintiff must show the traditional elements for punitive liability. Id.
116.82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971).
117. Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739,-, 487 P.2d 167, 168 (1971). The court found that
evidence of the guilty pleas was sufficient to establish liability in this case. Id. It is not clear whether
the court would require evidence of recklessness in the absence ofsuch charges.
118. 254 Or. 236, 458 P.2d 942 (1969).
119. Dorn v. Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, -, 458 P.2d 942, 943 (1969). The defendant, in his
answer, admitted crashing through the plaintiff's bedroom wall. Id.
120. Id. at -, 458 P.2d at 945. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 to
define recklessness and wantonness. Id. at 944. For the text of §500, see supra note 60.
121. 254 Or. at -, 458 P.2d at 944. The court stated that "where the violation of societal
interests is sufficiently great and of a kind that sanctions would tend to prevent... the use of punitive
damages is proper." Id. (quoting Noe v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 248 Or. 420, 425, 435 P.2d 306, 308
(1967)). See also Mason v. Householder, 58 Or. App. 192, 647 P.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1982) (evidence of
defendant's postaccident rehabilitation held inadmissible to mitigate punitive damages).
122. See, e.g., Ingram, 340 So. 2d at 924 (intoxication and negligence will not justify an award in
all cases).
123. Id. See also Comment, supra note 21, at 131 n.91 (plaintiff must show a nexus between
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FACTS ESTABLISHING WRONGFUL CONDUCT

In the most common approach to resolving the issue of
punitive damages and the drunken driver, courts do not presume
that recklessness flows from the act of drinking and driving.1 24 In
these jurisdictions the plaintiff must allege and prove facts that
establish reckless behavior beyond the mere act of driving while
intoxicated. 125
The Colorado Supreme Court in Mince v. Butters126 rejected the
presumption that voluntary intoxication is sufficiently reckless to
sustain an award of punitive damages.1 27 In Mince the trial court
refused to give the following jury instruction: "The operation of a
motor vehicle by one who is consciously under the influence of
intoxicating liquor so as to impair the ability of the operator to
drive carefully, is a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and
1 28
,safety of others."
Butters, the plaintiff, appealed the trial court's decision,
alleging that the trial court erred in refusing the requested
instruction.1 29 The appellate court reversed the trial court's
decision.1 30 The court of appeals stated that, in effect, the
instruction was a request for a directed verdict because it raised a
presumption of recklessness.' 31 Nevertheless, the appellate court
held that the instruction was permissible because "reasonable
wrongful conduct and intoxication).
124. See Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 (1929), cited with approval in Smith v. Chapman,
115 Ariz. 374, 565 P.2d 880 (Ct. App.), vacated, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977); Taylor v.
Suelrior Court. 24 Cal. 3d 890. 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); Mince v. Butters, 200
Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980); Walczak v. Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Madison v.
Wigal. 18 III. App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (App. Ct. 1958); Collins v. Black, - Miss. -. , 380
So. 2d 241 (1980); Allers v. Willis, Mont. -, 643 P.2d 592 (1982); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa.
Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (Ct. App.
1945). (,fJ
Ingram v. Pettit. 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976) (act of driving plus voluntary intoxication.
constitutes recklessness).
125. See, e.g., Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, -,
268 A.2d 157, 161 (1970). The Focht
court explained that in "certain factualcircumstances the risk to others by the drunken driver may be so
obvious and the probability that harm will follow so great that outrageous misconduct may be
established without reference to motive or intent." Id. (emphasis added). The logical inference from
this statement is that while proving motive or intent may not be necessary, the plaintiff must still
provide facts showing outrageous misconduct.
126. 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980).
127. Mince v. Butters, 200 Colo. 501,
-. , 616 P.2d 127, 128 (1980). The trier of fact must
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. Id.at __,
616 P.2d at 129.
128. Id. at __,
616 P.2d at 128. Section 13-25-127(2) of the Colorado Revised Statutes
requires that a claim for punitive damages be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. COLO. REv. STAT.
513-25-127(2) (1973).
129. 200 Colo. at __, 616 P.2d at 128.
130. Butters v. Mince, Colo.App.....
605 P.2d 922, 924 (Ct. App. 1979).
131. Mince, 200 Colo. at __, 616 P.2d at 128 (the requested instruction took the issue of
wanton and reckless disregard from the jury).
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persons could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence:
'that [Mince's] intoxication constituted wanton and reckless
disregard of [Butters'] rights and safety.' ''132
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
because punitive damages, which are a discretionary rather than a
mandatory award, cannot be granted as a matter of law. 133 The
court implied that if the tendered instruction was given to the jury,
a presumption of recklessness would arise from the act of driving
while intoxicated. 134 The result of this presumption would require
imposition of punitive damages whenever a plaintiff shows that the
defendant drove while intoxicated.135 The court noted that in
Colorado a plaintiff must prove punitive damages beyond a
reasonable doubt.136 Although a plaintiff may establish a case for
punitive damages, he or she is not entitled to them as a matter of
law. 137 Because punitive damages are a discretionary award, the
appellate court's holding, which raised a presumption of
recklessness, could not stand. 138 Therefore, the court held that the
trial court's refusal to give the requested jury instruction was
139
proper.
When a jurisdiction does not recognize a presumption of
recklessness or malice, the plaintiff must establish facts that support
a finding of recklessness. For example, in Madison v. Wiga 1 40 the
Illinois Appellate Court required the plantiff to prove the existence
of aggravating circumstances such as malice or recklessness to
support an award of punitive damages. 14 1 The plaintiff, Madison,
showed that the defendant was intoxicated while driving in the
wrong lane of a straight, flat, four lane highway and that the
defendant's condition caused a head-on collision. 14 2 The court
for the
found that these facts provided the proper circumstances
143
jury to infer recklessness and to award punitive damages.
132. Id.
133. Id. at __,
616 P.2d at 129. An award of punitive damages lies in the discretion of the
jury. Id.
134. See id. The instruction stated that driving while intoxicated was a reckless act. Id.
135. See id. The court rejected the presumption stating, "[L]iability to an injured person flows
from the offender's action. It is quite another matter, however, to conclude that in addition to
compensation, the defendant should be punished as a matter of law ...." Id.
136. Id. See CoLo. REv.STAT. 5 13-25-127(2) (1973).
137. Mince, 200 Colo. at -, 616 P.2d at 129.
138. Id.
139. Id. at__,
616 P.2d at 130.
140. 18 Il1. App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (App. Ct. 1958).
App. 2d 564, 568, 153 N.E.2d 90, 95 (App. Ct. 1958). Malice, a
141. Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill.
question of fact for the jury, may be inferred if it appears that the defendant acted in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Several other courts also require proof of aggravating
circumstances before they will allow an award of punitive
damages. 144 To establish this requirement the plaintiff must allege
specific facts indicating that the defendant acted recklessly. 14 5 For
example, a Delaware court found that aggravating circumstances
existed when a drunken driver was speeding and driving on the
wrong side of the road. 146 A Tennessee court looked to the
"condition and manner" in which the defendant operated his
vehicle to justify an award, 147 while the Mississippi Supreme Court
found that driving on the wrong side of the road at an unreasonable
rate of speed and failing to stop after the collision provided
circumstances that would uphold a punitive damage award. 148
In Focht v. Rabada149 a Pennsylvania court offered an
ambiguous standard by stating that a plaintiff may receive punitive
damages "under certain circumstances."'15 0 The court found that
the act of driving and drinking, considering all the surrounding
circumstances, was a proper consideration in determining the
award. 1 1 The court did not address the facts in Focht, but stated
that an intoxicated driver speeding through a "crowded
thoroughfare where there are many pedestrians would clearly be
52
liable for punitive damages." 1
In Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Mississippi, Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee, a simple description of the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the accident is sufficient to sustain an award of
punitive damages. 153 Although these jurisdictions do not recognize
144. For a discussion of cases in which courts found aggravating circumstances, see infra notes
146-52 and accompanying text.
145. For a discussion of cases in which courts found aggravating circumstances, see infra notes
146-52 and accompanying text.
146. Walczak v. Healy, 280 A.2d 728, 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (alcohol and speeding were
factors that made the defendant's conduct reprehensible).
147. Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, -,
191 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Ct. App. 1945) (witnesses
saw the defendant weave back and forth on the road just before striking a pedestrian; the defendant
left the scene of the accident, but was found later in a ditch).
148. Collins v. Black, -

Miss. -..

380 So. 2d 241, 244 (1980) (defendant was unable

to safely operate an automobile). See also Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50
So. 2d 572 (1951). The Tracy court noted, "Under the facts of this case we are of the opinion that the
jury would have been authorized to find.., reckless [conduct] as to justify the infliction of punitive
damages." Id. at 847, 50 So. 2d at 576.
149. 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (Super. Ct. 1970).
150. Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, -. , 268 A.2d 157, 160 (Super. Ct. 1970). The court
based its analysis on the Restatement of Torts §§ 500, 908. Id. For the current text of §§ 500 and 908,
see supra notes 33 & 60.
151. 217 Pa. Super. at __,
268 A.2d at 160 (court emphasized the great potential for harm
and serious injury when a driver is intoxicated).
152. Id. at __
268 A.2d at 161 n.l. The court noted the high percentage of fatalities and
injuries in accidents involving drunken drivers. Id.
153. See Mince, 200 Colo. at -, 616 P.2d at 129 (plaintiff must establish claim for punitive
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a presumption of recklessness, the courts require plaintiffs to do
little more than allege that the defendant was intoxicated and
speeding or driving in the wrong lane to recover punitive
15 4

damages.

The plaintiffs burden of proof to recover punitive damages is
minimal when the jurisdiction recognizes that driving while
intoxicated is a reckless act. The burden increases, however, when
the courts require that specific facts be introduced to show reckless
15
conduct. The courts in Arizona,15 5 California,

6

and Montana 1 57

impose the most stringent requirements upon a plaintiff. 5 8 The
Arizona Supreme Court has applied a detailed analysis of
proximate cause. 5 9 The California courts, on the other hand, focus
60
their discussion on the defendant's state of mind. 1
1. Proximate Cause
In Smith v. Chapman161 the Arizona Supreme Court stated that
a plaintiff must show that the defendant's "intoxication brought
about the acts which proximately caused the resulting accident and
injuries" in addition to alleging facts that establish recklessness. 162
In Smith the trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for a
directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages. 1 63 The Arizona
Court of Appeals overruled the trial court, stating that the jury
should determine the punitive damages. 164 The appellate court
held, however, that "intoxication plus negligent driving equals
damages beyond a reasonable doubt); Walczak, 280 A.2d at 730 (speeding and driving on the wrong
side of the road); Madison, 18 Il. App. 2d at -,
153 N.E.2d at 94 (jury should look to the
circumstances of the case to determine whether to award punitive damages); Collins, Miss. at
-,
380 So. 2d at 244 (unreasonable rate of speed); Focht, 217 Pa. Super. at-.,
268 A.2d at 160
(look to the surrounding circumstances); Pratt,
28 Tenn. App. at -. , 191 S.W.2d at 564 (condition
and manner in which automobile was operated).
154. See, e.g., Mince v. Butters, Coln. -,
616 P.2d 127 (1980) (refused to adopt a
presumption that voluntary intoxication plus driving equals recklessness or malice).
155. See Smith v.Chapman, 115 Ariz. 374, 565 P.2d 880 (Ct. App.), vacated, 115 Ariz. 211, 564
P.2d 900 (1977).
156. SeeTaylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
157. Allers v.Willis,
Mont.
-. , 643 P.2d 592 (1980).
158. For a discussion of the plaintiff's burden of proof in Arizona, California, and Montana, see

supra notes 124-84 and accompanying text.
159. See Smith, 115 Ariz. at -, 564 P.2d at 903-04.
160. See Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 894-97, 598 P.2d at 856-57, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695-97.
161. 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977).
162. Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, -, 564 P.2d 900, 905 (1977). The court stated that
the plaintiff must show that the defendant was negligent, that the defendant's drunkenness was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and facts showing the defendant's reckless conduct. Id.
163. Id. at -, 564 P.2d at 902.
164. Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 374,-, 565 P.2d 880, 881 (Ct. App. 1977). The appellate
court stated that sufficient evidence existed to determine whether the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. Id.
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reckless disregard for the safety and rights of others. ' 165 This
holding raised the presumption that drinking and driving constitute
166
recklessness.
On appeal the Arizona Supreme Court agreed that the trial
court's directed verdict was erroneous, but found that the court of
appeal's presumption of recklessness was also improper. 167 The
court explained that driving while intoxicated is a violation of a
statute. 168 The court stated that although this violation is
negligence per se, it is not necessarily actionable negligence. 169 The
plaintiff must show that the act, driving while intoxicated, was the
170
proximate cause of his injuries before liability will arise.
The court noted that to obtain punitive damages in Arizona,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct is
outrageous. 171 The court defined outrageous conduct as bad acts
coupled with a bad motive or reckless indifference to the interests of
others. 172 The jury must then decide whether the "driver's
voluntary intoxication was an inherent part of the negligent acts
which proximately caused the accident and resulting injuries, and
[whether] the defendant had acted in 'reckless indifference to the
interest of others.' "173
The court presented a hypothetical to illustrate its point. 174 A
driver, who had consumed enough alcohol to render himself
intoxicated, was returning home from a New Year's office party. 175
The driver was aware that his brakes were not in good working
order and that they had needed repair for several months. 176 As the
driver approached a stop sign, his brakes failed and he rear-ended a
car, causing injuries to the individuals ahead of him. 177 If a
165. Id. at __,
565 P.2d at 882. The court of appeals held "that voluntary intoxication on the
part of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident proximately caused by his negligent
operation of the vehicle constitutes a reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id.
166. See, e.g., Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976) (driving while intoxicated is
considered reckless).
167. Smith, 115 Ariz. at-.,
564 P.2d at 903 (court of appeals did not properly state the law).
168. Id. (driving while intoxicated is a violation of § 28-692 of the Arizona Revised Statutes). See
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (1982).
169. Smith, 115 Ariz. at-.,
564 P.2d at 903.
170. Id. The plaintiff must show by the greater weight of the evidence that the act, which is
negligent per se, is the proximate cause of his or her injury. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment b to define
outrageous conduct. Id. For the text of § 908, see supra note 33.
173. Smith, 115 Ariz. at-,
564 P.2d at 904. The punitive damages issue involves a question
of fact, which should properly remain with thejury. Id. See also Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639
(1929) (punitive damages awarded when taxicab driver sped through crowds and drove on the wrong
side of the road).
174. Smith, 115 Ariz. at-,
564 P.2d at 904.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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reasonable and prudent person would have repaired the brakes, the
driver may be negligent for failing to maintain his automobile in a
safe condition.

178

In that hypothetical, the brake failure caused the accident,
rather than the driver's intoxication. 1 79 If a plaintiff were to allege
that the driver's intoxication caused the accident, his claim for
punitive damages would fail because the intoxication was not the
proximate cause of his injuries. 18 0
In vacating the decision of the court below, the Arizona
Supreme Court stated that negligence and intoxication do not
equal recklessness in all cases.1 81 Such an inference "eliminates the
necessity of showing proximate cause and makes a driver, who has
had some alcoholic beverage previous to driving, an insurer in
strict liability for punitive damages, whether or not the
consumption of alcohol has anything whatever to do with a
subsequent accident." 182 The Smith court found that under Arizona
tort law, such an inference was not permissible. 18 3
Arizona,18 4 California, 8 5 Florida, 18 6 and Kansas 18 7 are the
only jurisdictions that have expressly addressed the issue of
causation in drunken driver cases. Of these jurisdictions, Arizona
provides the most thorough analysis of the causation problem. 188
Although the California Supreme Court has not analyzed the issue,
the California Legislature has adopted a statutory provision
providing that "the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the
proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated
person." 189 Therefore, the plaintiff is relieved of proving causation.
The discussion of causation is somewhat confusing in Ingram v.
Pettit.190 In Ingram the Florida Supreme Court held that "juries may
award punitive damages where voluntary intoxication is involved
in an automobile accident ... without regard to external proof of
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (failure to show that the intoxication contributed to the cause of the accident will result
in a directed verdict for the defendant).
564 P.2d at 903. Cf. Anderson v. Morgan, 73 Ariz. 344, 241 P.2d 786 (1952)
181. Id. at -,
(defendant's intoxication was not the proximate cause of the accident).
182. 115 Ariz. at-., 564 P.2d at 903.
183. Id. (whether negligence is the proximate cause of an injury is a question of fact for the jury).
184. See Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977).
185. Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
186. Ingram v. Pettit. 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976).
187. Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954).
188. SeeSmith, 115 Ariz. at-_, 564 P.2d at 903-04.
189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b) (West Supp. 1983).
190. 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976). See Case Comment, Negligent Intoxicated DriverLiable for Punitive
Damages Without Proof of Abnornal or Reckless Driving, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 221 (1978). See generally
Comment, supra note 21, at 133-38 (discussion of causation in cases involving punitive damages and
drunken drivers).
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carelessness or abnormal driving." 19 1 A plaintiff, however, must
establish proximate cause and prove that he is entitled to
192
compensatory damages.
Dissenting Justice Sundberg argued that this holding, in fact,
imposed strict liability upon the intoxicated driver. 19 3 The dissent
noted that to find the defendant liable, the plaintiff need only prove
that the accident occurred and present evidence of the defendant's
intoxication. 194 Although the majority in Ingram holds that proof of
causation is necessary, 195 they also state that "driving 'while
intoxicated' evinces, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude
for a jury to . . . award . . . punitive damages if it determines
liability exists for compensatory damages." 196 The first statement
appears to require proof that the intoxication caused the accident,
while the latter requires only proof of intoxication. 197
The Florida Supreme Court has not expressly resolved the
issue of causation. In Nales v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,198 however, an appellate court stated that "punitive damages
are recoverable in automobile accident cases, and specifically may
be awarded where voluntary intoxication is involved. ' 199 The
court of appeals did not address the issue of causation. 20 0 The
Florida Supreme Court subsequently denied the petition for
20
review. 1
Although the issue of causation remains unclear in Florida, the
Kansas Supreme Court firmly established its punitive damages rule
191. Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1976).
192. Id. at 924. The court also stated, "We do not hold that intoxication coupled with
negligence will always justify an award of punitive damages." Id.
193. Id. at 926 (Sundberg,J., dissenting).
194. Id. The dissent stated that the "intoxicated driver becomes an insurer, to the full extent of
punitive damages, irrespective ofany showing that his conduct in the operation of the automobile fell
below that standard of care which is expected of a reasonable, prudent [person] under similar
circumstances." Id.
195. Id. at 924.
196. Id. The majority holding is based upon the policy consideration that drunken drivers are a
menace to the public and should be discouraged by punishment. Id. at 925.
197. Id. at 926. (Sundberg, J., dissenting). Justice Sundberg stated:
The majority opinion extends the strict liability concept to the recovery of
punitive damages, but says that the traditional elements such as proximate causation
and an underlying award of compensatory damages must still be proved. But what
does this mean - that the accident caused injury or that the intoxication, without
more, caused the accident to occur?
Id.
198. 398 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petitionforreview denied, 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1981).
199. Nales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(plaintiff sought a punitive damage award even though he was subject to the Florida no-fault law and
could not receive compensatory damages), petitionforreview denied, 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1981).
200. 398 So. 2d at 456. Although the court did not award compensatory damages, it did award
punitive damages. Id.
201. 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1981).
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in Gesslein v. Britton.202 In Gesslein the plaintiff merely alleged that
the defendant acted wantonly, wrongfully, and recklessly. 20 3 The
plaintiff did not allege that the defendant's intoxication caused him
to drive on the wrong side of the road or caused him to fail to keep
his vehicle under proper control.204 The court found that the
plaintiffs allegation was only descriptive in nature and did not
20 5
establish facts to support a claim for punitive damages.
Therefore, the court denied the plaintiff's claim for punitive
206
damages because the plaintiff failed to establish causation.
In sum, few courts specifically address the issue of causation.
The Gesslein case, however, demonstrates the importance of
alleging and proving proximate cause. To avoid a denial of
punitive damages, a plaintiff should allege that the defendant's
intoxication caused the negligent acts. Proof of abnormal or
careless driving would also assist in his or her case.
2. Awareness of the Consequences
Because the California Legislature recognizes that the
"consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of
injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person,''207 the
court did not dwell on the issue of causation in Taylor v. Superior
Court.20 8 Rather, the court took a novel approach to the issue of
drunken drivers and punitive damages by emphasizing the
foreseeability of harm that would follow from the act of drinking
209
and driving.
202. 175 Kan. 661, 664, 266 P.2d 263, 265 (1954).
203. Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 663, 266 P.2d 263, 265 (1954). The plaintiff's petition
alleged the following:

At said time and place, said defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and without regard to the safety of plaintiff, wrongfully, wantonly and
recklessly drove his automobile upon the wrong side of the highway and into and
against the automobile in which plaintiff was riding, by which plaintiff is entitled to

punitive damages in the sum of $5,000.00.
Id. at 662, 266 P.2d at 264.
204. Id. at 664, 266 P.2d at 265. The court stated that the plaintiff must allege facts showing
gross and wanton negligence. Id.
205. Id. Wantonly, recklessly, or wrongfully are words that merely state a conclusion and cannot
substitute for facts disclosing that type of conduct. Id.
206. Id. at 663-64, 266 P.2d at 265. The allegations in the plaintiff's petition failed to state a
cause of action for punitive damages. Id.

207. CAL. CIV. Cone § 1714(b) (West 1978).
208. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
209. Taylor v.Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895-96, 598 P.2d 854. 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693,
696 (1979). A wealth of legal writing resulted from the Taylor decision. See Note, Taylor v. Superior
Court: Punitive Damagesfor Nondeliberate Torts - The Drunk Driving Context, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 911
(1980); Note, Punitive Damages and the Intoxicated Driver: An Approach to Taylor v. Superior Court, 31
HASTINGS L. J. 307 (1979): Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPPERDIN.E L. Ra,.
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The Taylor decision is particularly significant in the area of
punitive damages and drunken drivers because it overruled 2 10 the
California Court of Appeals' decision in Gombos v. Ashe. 2 11 The
Gombos court held that punitive damages were not allowed in
2 12
drunken driver cases in California.
In Combos a California appellate court stated that "[o]ne who
becomes intoxicated, knowing he intends to drive his automobile
on the highway, is of course negligent, and perhaps grossly
negligent. It is a reckless and wrongful and illegal thing to do. But it
is not a malicious act." ' 21 3 Merely characterizing a defendant's
conduct as reckless, wrongful, or illegal did not establish the
element of actual malice required by California courts in 1958.214
In Taylor, decided in 1979, the California Supreme Court held
that the element of malice was fulfilled by showing the defendant's
conscious disregard for the safety of others. 21 5 Conscious disregard
exists when the defendant is "aware of the probable dangerous
consequences of his conduct, [but] he wilfully and deliberately
fail[s] to avoid those consequences.' '216
The plaintiff in Taylor presented evidence of the defendant's
history of alcoholism and prior arrests and convictions for drunken
driving to show that defendant Stille knew of the safety hazard he
created when driving while intoxicated. 21 7 The court stated that it
was not necessary to present this evidence, although these facts
would serve to heighten the foreseeability and probability of an
accident. 218 The court did not elaborate on what facts must be
117 (1980); Case Comment, Punitive Damages Properly Awarded Against Intoxicated Drivers - Taylor v.
Superior Court, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1013 (1980); Case Comment, CaliforniaSupreme Court Permits
Punitive Damage ClaimAgainst Intoxicated Driver, 2 WHITTIER L. REv. 775 (1980). But see Note, Malice in
Wonderland: Taylor v. SuperiorCourt, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 219 (1980).
210. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 900, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
211. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (Ct. App. 1958).
212. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 527, 322 P.2d, 933, 940 (Ct. App. 1958). In
Gombos the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was "knowingly and wilfully intoxicated" and that he
drove recklessly with "absolute disregard and callous indifference to the rights and safety" ofothers.
322 P.2d at 939. The court held, however, that no express or implied malice existed. Id.
Id. at .,
(quoted in Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 856, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696).
213. Combos, 158 Cal. App. 2d at 527, 322 P.2d at 940.
214. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97 (quoting Combos, 158
Cal. App. 2d at 527, 322 P.2d at 940).
215. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696. Quoting Dean Prosser,
the court stated that punitive damages would be allowed when there are "circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the
defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may
be called wilful or wanton." Id. at 894-95, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 5 2 (4th ed. 1971)).
216. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896-97, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (showing of conscious
disregard justifies an award of punitive damages).
217. Id. at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697. The court stated that the combination of
drinking and driving was "lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving
incidents." Id. at 897, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
218. Id. at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
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presented to uphold a finding of awareness of the potential harm;
rather, the Taylor court merely stated that driving after drinking
19
was a commonly understood risk. 2
To counter the allegation of awareness, Stille argued that his
alcoholism rendered his drinking involuntary and that the court
should not punish him because he lacked sufficient wilfulness to
control his conduct. 2 20 The court's response to Stille's argument
was that volition or wilfulness is a question of fact for the jury.221
The Taylor court summarized its holding by stating that "one
who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume
alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the
outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle
demonstrates, . . . 'a conscious and deliberate disregard of the
interests of others.' ",222 The court's holding eliminates the
plaintiffs requirement of proving actual malice. 223 The plaintiff,
however, still must show that the defendant became voluntarily
intoxicated, that he was aware of the risk created by his conduct,
and that the defendant knew he would drive after becoming
intoxicated when he began consuming alcohol. 224 Once the plaintiff
presents this evidence, the jury may infer from these facts that the
defendant exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others. 225
In sum, the courts in Arizona, California, and Montana have
increased the burden of proof for obtaining punitive damages in an
alcohol related accident beyond that found in any other
219. Id. at 896-97, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697. See Comment, Taylor v.SuperiorCourt:
Punitive Damages for Nondeliberate Torts The Drunk Driving Context, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 911, 919
(presumption that all drunken drivers are a safety hazard should be rebuttable).
220. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699. See also Infeld v. Sullivan,
151 Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964). The theory that a defendant, because of his intoxication, did
not possess the requisite state of mind was rejected by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Id.at _
,
199 A.2d at 695. The court held that the defendant was able to exercise a conscious choice in
deciding whether to drive after drinking. Id.
221. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
222. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 2, at 10).
223. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
224. Id. at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699. See also Allers v. Willis,
- Mont.
-,
643 P.2d 592 (1982) (court adopted the holding in Taylor to make an award of punitive
damages available in Montana).
225. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 897, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697. Section 3294 of the
California Civil Code, which authorizes an award of punitive damages, was amended after the Taylor
decision. Prior to the amendment the statute provided:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) (amended 1980). After Taylor the words "express or implied"
were deleted and a definition of malice was provided: "Malice means conduct which is intended by
the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See id.(West Supp. 1983).
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jurisdiction. Although the requirements in these states may appear
to impose an unduly heavy burden of proof upon the plaintiff, these
courts recognize the need for proper safeguards against frivolous
claims. 226

D.

DENIAL OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The majority of courts hold that punitive damages in a
drunken driver case are permissible. A minority of jurisdictions,
however, deny the award and hold that the act of driving while
227
intoxicated does not constitute an intentional or malicious act.
These cases, however, are distinguishable because little or no
228
alcohol was consumed by the defendant prior to the accident.
In Maryland the court held in Davis v. Gordon229 that punitive
damages were not allowed because no malice or evil intent
existed. 230 The court noted, however, that no evidence of
intoxication was presented by the plaintiff. 23 1 The court also stated

that the rules of the road were better regulators of safety than
inflammatory verdicts. 2 32 A federal court later relied on the Davis
case to deny punitive damages even though evidence of intoxication
233
was presented by the plaintiff.

An Oklahoma court denied the defendant's request for
punitive damages in his cross-petition because no malice or evil
226. For a discussion of burdens of proof in Arizona, California, and Montana, see supra notes
161-225 and accompanying text.
227. Jurisdictions that deny an award of punitive damages include: Indiana (see Thompson v.
Pickle, 136 Ind. App. 139, 191 N.E.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1963) (driving while intoxicated is not sufficient
to constitute willful or wanton misconduct)); new Hampshire (seeJohnsen v. Fernald, 120 N.H. 440,
416 A.2d 1367 (1980) (act of driving while under the influence is not actual malice)); North Carolina
(see Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327, 174 S.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1970) (wantonness connotes
intentional wrongdoing)); Oklahoma (see Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247 P.2d 964 (1952) (no
malice or evil intent found)); Texas (see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1957)
(no evidence of malice)); Virginia (see Baker v. Markus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960) (no
evidence of criminal indifference or conscious disregard of the rights of others)). See also Note, The
Drinking Driver and Punitive Damages, 7 WAKE FORFST L. REv. 528 (1971) (discussing the North
Carolina case Brake v. Harper).
Three other jurisdictions have denied punitive damages on other grounds: Kansas (see Gesslein
v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954) (plaintiff failed to establish causation)); Maryland (see
Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944) (no malice or evil intent found)); Michigan (see
McLaren v. Zeilinger, 103 Mich. App. 22, 302 N.W.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1981) (exemplary damages
not allowed in automobile accident cases)).
228. E.g., Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129,_., 36 A.2d 699, 700 (1944).
229. 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
230. Id. at -,
36 A.2d at 700. To receive an award of punitive damages, the plaintiff must
show an element of fraud, malice, or evil intent. Id. at-.,
36 A.2d at 701.
231. Id. at-., 36 A.2d at 700.
232. Id. at -, 36 A.2d at 701. The fear of arrest is a better deterrent than a damage award.
Id.
233. Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The evidence showed that the
defendant staggered and that his speech was confused. Id. The Giddingscourt relied on Maryland law
to reach its decision. Id. at 587. Hence, this case is not binding in either Maryland or the District of
Columbia.
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intent was found. 234 The plaintiff admitted consuming one can of
beer prior to the accident; the jury, however, did not find that the
plaintiff was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 235 In a
North Carolina case a highway patrolman testified that, in his
opinion, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol, but the
patrolman could not remember the results of the breathalyzer
test. 236 In a Virginia case the defendant admitted taking two drinks
of vodka. 237 The police, however, concluded that her intoxication
was a "borderline case" and therefore, only charged her with
238
reckless driving.
A Michigan court denied an award of punitive damages
because exemplary damages are not allowed in automobile accident
cases even when the plaintiff proves gross negligence. 239 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must establish
actual malice to support an award of punitive damages. 240 The
court noted, however, that the legislature was free to impose
24 1
statutory punitive liability upon drunken drivers.
Although several courts deny awards of punitive damages on
the grounds that the act of drinking and driving is not a malicious
act, this rationale may be attributed to the existence of mitigating
circumstances. 242 The court's reluctance to award punitive
damages is probably based on the defendant's lack of intoxication
or low level of drunkenness.
IV. LIABILITY OF DRUNKEN DRIVERS FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota courts have not addressed the issue of:
punitive damages in drunken driver cases. Thus far, the courts use
only criminal sanctions to penalize drunken drivers. 243 In North
234. Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112,

__, 247 P.2d 964, 969 (1952).

235. Id. at -, 247 P.2d at 968.
236. Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327,
-, 174 S.E.2d 74, 75 (Ct. App. 1970). The officer
recalled that the blood alcohol content was less than 0.10 %. Id. See also Note, Damages - The Drinking
Driverand PunitiveDamages, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 528 (1971) (discusses Brakecase).
237. Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 907, 114 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1960).
238. Id. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621. The court stated that the defendant's "conduct may have
been partly due to intoxicants." Id.
239. MeLaren v. Zeilinger, 103 Mich. App. 22, -,
302 N.W.2d 583, 585 (Ct. App. 1981)
(exemplary damages are compensatory in nature and are properly a part of actual damages).
240. Johnsen v. Fernald, 120 N.H. 440,
-, 416 A.2d 1367, 1368 (1980) (plaintiffmust show
ill will, hatred, hostility, or evil motive).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Baker, 201 Va. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621.
243. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1981). Section 39-08-01 provides:
1.

No person shall drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a
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Dakota driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a
misdemeanor carrying a minimum penalty of either three days in
jail, a fine of one hundred dollars, or both. 244 An offender may have
his driver's license suspended for one month. 245 Furthermore, once
an offender has been convicted, the court may order the motor
vehicle license plates impounded for the duration of the
suspension. 246 The court also has the option of sentencing the
highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of
access for vehicular use in this state if:
b. He is under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
2.

A person violating any provision of this section is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor for the first conviction in a twenty-four-month period, and of a
class A misdemeanor for the second conviction in a twenty-four-month period.
The minimum penalty for such violation shall be either three days in jail or a
fine of one hundred dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment.

Id. The 48th Legislative Assembly of the State of North Dakota amended the statutes pertaining to
driving while intoxicated offenses. The amendments take effect July 1, 1983. The amendments to
§ 39-08-01 include: a first or second conviction within a five year period will be a class B
misdemeanor, a later conviction within a five year period will be a class A misdemeanor, and a
fourth or subsequent violation within a seven year period will be a class A misdemeanor.
The amendments to § 39-08-01 also change the minimum penalties applicable to driving while
intoxicated offenses. For a first offense, the sentence must include both a fine of at least $250 and
referral for addiction evaluation. For a second offense within five years, the sentence must include at
least four days imprisonment or ten days of community service, a fine of at least $500, and referral
for addiction evaluation. The third offense within a five year period requires a sentence of at least 60
days imprisonment, a fine of $1000, and referral for addiction evaluation. For a fourth
conviction within seven years, the sentence must include 180 days imprisonment and a fine of $1000.
These penalties are mandatory minimum sentences.
Only violations occurring after July 1, 1981, will be considered in determining the number of
offenses under the amendments. S. 2373, 48th Leg., N.D. Sess. Laws __,
amending N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1981).
The North Dakota Legislature also created a new subsection to § 39-06.1-10 that mandates
penalties for failing to enroll in an addiction treatment program. Following addiction evaluation
under § 39-08-01, if the offender receives notification from the commissioner to enroll in an addiction
treatment program and fails to enroll within 30 days of notification, the court shall suspend the
ol nder's driver's license as follows: The suspension for the first violation within a five year period
must be at least 180 days; the suspension for a second offense within a five year period must be at
least one year; the suspension for a third offense within a five year period must be at least two years.
If an offender has a fourth conviction within seven years, the license can only be restored after the
offender completes addiction treatment and has had no alcohol or drug-related offenses for two
consecutive years after completion of treatment. S. 2373, 48th Leg., N.D. Sess. Laws
(created new subsection to N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10 (Supp. 1981)).
244. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2). For the first conviction in a 24 month period, the
defendant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; for the second conviction in a 24 month period, the
violation is a class A misdemeanor. Id. For the applicable amendments to 5 39-08-01, see supra note
243.
245. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10(3)(b)(5). This section states that upon a conviction for
driving while intoxicated, 15 points are assessed against the offender's driver's license. Id. Under
§ 39-06.1-10(2) this assessment results in a license suspension of seven days for each point over 11,
once 13 points have been accumulated. The result is a 28 day suspension of the driver's license. Id.
§39-06.1-10(2).
Under the 1983 amendments to § 39-06.1-10, 24 points will be assessed if an offender has had no
previous driving while intoxicated convictions within a five year period. The amendments thus
provide that the suspension for a first offense within a five year period must be for 91 days, which is
seven days for each point over 11. A second conviction within a five year period will result in an
assessment of 63 points, which results in a suspension of one year. S. 2373, 48th Leg., N.D.
Sess. Laws -, amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06.1-10 (Supp. 1981).
246. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-61(4). Section 39-08-01(4) provides:
Upon conviction, the court may order the motor vehicle number plates of the motor
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individual to a treatment facility. 247
In addition to criminal sanctions, North Dakota courts may
impose civil penalties upon drunken drivers who cause personal
injury to another person. The courts may impose these civil
penalties based on the tort 248 and punitive damage 249 statutes of the
North Dakota Century Code. An examination of various areas of
the law reveals whether an award of punitive damages is feasible in
a case involving drunken drivers in North Dakota. This analysis
focuses upon the elements of a tort and a determination of the
requisite state of mind that will support an award of punitive
damages.
A.

LIABILITY IN TORT: BREACHING THE DUTY OF CARE

Before negligence becomes actionable in North Dakota, the
plaintiff must show the "existence of a duty or obligation on the
part of one to protect another from injury, the failure to discharge
that duty, and resulting injury to another proximately caused by
the breach of duty."

250

This requirement thus has four elements: a

vehicle owned and operated by the offender at the time of the oflense to be impounded
...for the duration of the period of suspension of the offender's driver's license or
driving privilege by the licensing authority.
Id.
247. Id. §39-08-01(5). Section 39-08-01(5) provides:
The court may, upon a conviction of a person under this section, but prior to
sentencing, refer the person to an addiction facility licensed by the North Dakota state
department of health for diagnosis. Upon receipt of the results of this diagnosis, the
court may impose a sentence as prescribed in this section or it may sentence the person
to treatment in a facility approved by the North Dakota department of human
services.
Id. Under the 1983 amendments the sentence must include referral for addiction evaluation. See supra
note 243.
248. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1975). Section 9-10-06 provides:
Everyone is responsible not only for the result of his willful acts but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his
property or person. The extent of-the liability in such case is defined by sections 32-0301 to 32-03-19, inclusive.
Id.
249. Id. § 32-03-07 (Supp. 1981). Punitive damages are defined as follows:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the
court or jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
Id.
250. Carlson Homes, Inc. v. Messmer, 307 N.W.2d 564, 566 (N.D. 1981) (negligence in
landscaping). The court in Carlson imposed a duty to protect another person from injury. Id. A
plaintiff could argue that given the statistical probability of an automobile accident involving a
drunken driver, one who drinks and drives has breached his or her duty to protect other persons from
injury.
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duty, a breach of that duty, proximate cause, and damage or
251
injury.
To establish the first element, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to "refrain from injurious
conduct. ' 252 Conduct that is merely improper or violates a moral
right differs from a legal right imposed by law. 25 3 A moral wrong is
25 4
not a tort unless a defendant violates a legal right or duty.
255
Section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
imposes on every driver a duty to refrain from driving while
intoxicated.256 The purpose of section 39-08-01 is to deter
intoxicated persons from driving. 25 7 When an intoxicated person
attempts to drive an automobile, he or she has violated a statutory 258
duty to refrain from driving while intoxicated.
Although section 39-08-01 establishes a duty, the plaintiff
must also show that the defendant owed that duty to the plaintiff. 25 9
The injured party must be a member of the class the statute is
intended to protect. 2 60 If he or she is not a member, the defendant
261
owes no duty to that person.
To determine whether the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff requires an examination of the public policy underlying
the statute prohibiting drinking and driving. In imposing civil
liability stemming from a criminal violation, such as driving while
intoxicated, courts are enforcing the policy or purpose underlying
the statute. 262 The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that
"one who has been drinking intoxicating liquor should not be
encouraged to test his driving ability on the highway, even for a
short distance, where his life and the lives of others hang in the balance. '263
251. W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 30, at 143. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281

(1979) (elements of a claim for negligence).
252. Vasichek v. Thorsen, 271 N.W.2d 555, 561 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mourn v. Maercklein, 201

N.W.2d 399, 402 (N.D. 1972)).

253. Clairmont v. State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co., 295 N.W.2d 154, 158 (N.D. 1980)

(bank assumed a duty by informing a client that a deposit was made in his account).
254. Id.
255. See N.D. CENT. CODE §39-08-01 (1) (b) (Supp. 1981) (prohibits driving while intoxicated).
256. Id.
257. State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 255 (N.D. 1977) (an intoxicated driver is a threat to the
safety of the public).
258. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-08-01 (1) (b) (Supp. 1981); W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 36, at
190 (statutes fix standards for all members of the community).
259. Clairmont, 295 N.W.2d at 158 (to constitute a tort, a legal right or duty must exist in favor
of the plaintiff). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 36 at 192-93 (whether a statute may be
construed to include plaintiffas a member of the protected class).
260. Hennenfent v. Flath, 66 N.W.2d 533, 536 (N.D. 1954).
261. See id. Seealso W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 36, at 192-93.
262. W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 36, at 191. Dean Prosser describes imposition of civil
penalties for violations of statutes as judicial legislation in which courts construe the conduct they

believe the legislature intended. Id.
263. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d at 255 (emphasis added) (action involved actual physical control of the
vehicle; defendant was threat to safety merely by sitting behind the wheel).
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The court's statement thus suggests that the class of persons section
39-08-01 protects includes the driver and those persons he or she
may encounter on the road. 264
When a plaintiff presents this evidence at trial, proof of a
violation of a statutory duty is evidence of negligence, rather than
negligence per se. 265 The court's theory underlying this rationale is
that a reasonable person obeys the law; therefore, one who has not
obeyed the law is not reasonable and may be negligent. 266 A
plaintiff fulfills the first two elements of a negligence claim when he
or she establishes that a person, who has a duty to refrain from
driving while intoxicated, disregards that duty.
The third element of an actionable negligence claim requires
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's negligent act proximately
caused the resulting injuries. 2 67 The " '[p]roximate cause' of an
injury is a cause which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any controlling, intervening cause, produces injury,
268
and without which it would not have occurred. ,
Another aspect of proximate cause requires that the defendant
reasonably foresee the probable results of his or her act. 269 An
injury is not actionable if it is not foreseeable or reasonably
anticipated as a probable result of the act. 270 Courts hold the
defendant to the standard of an ordinarily prudent person. 27 1 If a
reasonable or ordinarily prudent person should have foreseen the
probable results of the negligent act, the defendant is liable for the
results. 2 72 Whether the defendant actually foresaw the results is
irrelevant. 273 If a person has no knowledgeable or foreseeable
grounds to anticipate that his or her actions would result in injury
to another, that person is not liable. 2 74 The North Dakota Supreme
264. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 36, at 197 (assumption that a statute includes all risks
reasonably anticipated).
265. See Nitschke v. Barnick, 226 N.W.2d 785, 788 (N.D. 1975) (violation of the statutory rule
of the road); Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 828 (N.D. 1968) (pedestrian jaywalking); Renschler v.
Baltzer, 95 N.W.2d 574, 576 (N.D. 1959) (violations of statutory rules of the road as evidence of
negligence).
266. W. PROSSER, supra note 36, §36, at 191.
267. Arneson v. City of Fargo, 303 N.W.2d 515, 519 (N.D. 1981). See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 36, §30, at 143.
268. Mourn v. Maercklein, 201 N.W.2d 399, 402 (N.D. 1972) (injury must be direct result of
negligent breach of duty).
269. Id. The issue in Mourn was whether an employer's request that his employee report to work
during a blizzard was negligent and the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 399. See also
F-M Potatoes, Inc. v. Suda, 259 N.W.2d 487, 493 (N.D. 1977) (whether bailee was negligent in
storing perishable goods).
270. Mourn, 201 N.W.2d at 402.
271. E.g., id. The ordinarily prudent person is one of ordinary intelligence in light of attending
circumstances. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 403. One test of proximate cause is foreseeability. Id.
274. Id.
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Court has stated, "The law requires that a person reasonably
guard against probabilities - not against all possibilities."275
The final element of the claim requires that actual damages or
injuries result from the negligent act. 276 To establish a claim, the
plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered injuries or damages by
277
the defendant's act.
Applying this tort analysis to a drunken driver case, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant's act of driving while
intoxicated is negligent. To prove negligence the plaintiff must
show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to refrain from
driving while intoxicated and that the defendant breached that
duty.
The plaintiff must then prove that the negligent act
proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. Furthermore, since
violation of a statute is not negligence per se in North Dakota, 278
North Dakota courts are unlikely to follow other states, such as
Florida, that find the act of driving while intoxicated presumptively
279
reckless conduct.
An alternative approach is to show that the defendant's
280
intoxication caused him or her to drive in a reckless manner.
Showing that the plaintiffs injuries are the natural and probable
consequences of the defendant's intoxication would require
evidence, for example, that the defendant was driving recklessly, 81
28 3
in the wrong lane, 282 or at an excessive and uncontrollable speed.
The plaintiff should not merely allege that the act of driving while
intoxicated is reckless, rather he or she should allege facts that
establish negligent driving.284
The plaintiff also must show that the defendant should have
foreseen the probability that his drunkenness would impair his
driving. 285 The plaintiff, however, need not establish that the
275. Id.
276. Arneson, 303 N.W.2d at 519. Seealso W. PROSSER, supra note 36, 9 30, at 143.
277. Arneson, 303 N.W.2d at 519. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 36, § 30, at 143.
278. See, e.g., Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 829 (N.D. 1968).
279. See Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976) (driving while intoxicated itself supports an
award of punitive damages).
280. See, e.g., Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977) (intoxication must be
proximate cause of injuries).
281. See, e.g., Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (App. Ct. 1958)
(recklessness inferred from defendant driving in the wrong lane).
282. See, e.g., Walczak v. Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (aggravating
circumstances shown).
283. See, e.g., Collins v. Black,__ Miss. -,
380 So. 2d 241 (1980) (circumstances of the
accident support an award).
284. See, e.g., Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954) (punitive damages denied
for failure to state a claim).
285. See Moum, 201 N.W.2d at 403. See also Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d
854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) (defendant must be aware of the probable consequences of his act).
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defendant himself was able to reasonably foresee an accident
resulting in injuries. 286 If a reasonably prudent person could
anticipate that the consumption of alcoholic beverages to the point
of intoxication is likely to result in an accident, liability will
follow.287
B.

PROVING MALICE IN NORTH DAKOTA

Once the plaintiff has established liability for actual damages
by proving the elements of a tort, North Dakota law permits an
award of punitive damages. 288 In North Dakota, courts award
punitive damages when a defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud,
or malice in a breach of an obligation not arising from a contract. 289
The legislature has stated that the award is for the sake of example
290
and for the punishment of the defendant.
In an early assault and battery case in North Dakota, the court
stated that actual malice involves personal hatred or ill will of one
person to another. 29 1 The court noted that presumed or implied
malice, which will also support an award of punitive damages,
refers to a state of mind that reflects a reckless attitude toward the
law and the legal rights of another citizen. 292 While malice means a
wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, courts have not
limited it to ill will or hatred. 2 93 Presumed malice exists when a
defendant's conduct is unjustifiable or when his wrongful act is
294
done intentionally without just cause or excuse.
In Dahlen v. Landis295 the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the defendant's state of mind in relation to
punitive damages. 296 The court did not require direct evidence of a
person's mental state. 297 Rather, the court stated that it may look to
the character of the act and its surrounding circumstances to
286. See Moum, 201 N.W.2d at 403.
287. Id.
288. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32"03"07 (1976) (punitive damages allowed in addition to actual
damages).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Shoemaker v. Sonju, 15 N.D. 518, 524, 108 N.W. 42, 44 (1906) (assault and battery). See
also, Kerzmann v. Rohweder, 321 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1982) (fraud); Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d
63 (N.D. 1981) (assault and battery); Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1969) (action for
conversion of hay); Neidhardt v. Siverts, 103 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1960) (action for conversion of hay).
292. Shoemaker, 15 N.D. at 524, 108 N.W. at 44.
293. Remmick, 165 N.W.2d at 71 (malice need not be directed against the plaintiff).
294. Id.
295. 314 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1981).
296. Dahlen v. Landis. 314 N.W.2d 63, 69 (N.D. 1981) (citing Neidhart, 103 N.W.2d at 102.)
297. 314 N.W.2d at 69.

19831

NOTE

443

determine the actor's motive or purpose. 298 If the plaintiff shows
that the motive is improper and unjustifiable, a finding of
maliciousness is proper. 299
To establish that a drunken driver is liable for punitive
damages, a plaintiff should attempt to show presumed or implied
malice because personal hatred or ill will usually does not- exist
between the parties. Presumed or implied malice requires a
showing by the plaintiff that the drunken driver recklessly ignored
30 0
the law or the rights of another citizen.
To determine the motive or purpose underlying the
defendant's act, a plaintiff may raise the disputable or rebuttable
presumption that an unlawful act is committed with an unlawful
intent. 30 1 A wrongful or improper motive, which is unjustifiable,
30 2
supports a finding of recklessness.
Alternatively, a court may find recklessness by emphasizing
the defendant's disregard or indifference to the consequences of his
or her act. 30 3 A second disputable or rebuttable presumption states

that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his or her
voluntary act. 30 4 Therefore, one who attempts to drive while

intoxicated may be presumed to intend the consequences of that
act. Indifference to those consequences also establishes a wrongful
and improper motive that will support an award of punitive
298.
299.
wrongful
300.
301.

Id.
Id. See also Kerzmann, 321 N.W.2d at 87 n.2 (jury instruction stating that malice includes
and improper motives was proper).
Dahlen, 314 N.W.2d at 69.
N.D. CENT. CODE §31-11-03(2) (1976). Section 31-11-03(2) provides:

All presumptions other than those set forth in section 31-11-02 are satisfactory if
uncontradicted. They are denominated disputable presumptions and may be
contradicted by other evidence. The following are of that kind:
(2) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent.
Id.Seealso N.D. R. EvID. 301 (a). Rule"301 states:
[I]f facts giving rise to a presumption are established by credible evidence, the
presumption substitutes for evidence of the existence of the fact presumed until the
trier of fact finds from credible evidence that the fact presumed does not exist, in which
event the presumption is rebutted and ceases to operate. A party against whom a
presumption is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the
presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
Id.
302. Dahlen, 314 N.W.2d at 69.
303. Neidhard, 103 N.W.2d at 102 (wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the plaintiff
constitutes a malicious act).
304. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-03(3) (1976). This section states "[t]hat a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary act." Id. See also Remmick, 165 N.W.2d at 72 (citing N.D.
CENT. CODE § 31-11-03(3) (1960)).
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damages.3 °5
Because the surrounding circumstances and the character of
the act are proper areas of inquiry for the fact finder to determine
the defendant's state of mind,3 0 6 the actual facts of the case may be
sufficient to establish reckless conduct. 30 7 For example, evidence
that the defendant drove his or her automobile in a highly irregular
manner may constitute reckless driving and, therefore, establish a
reckless state of mind. 30 8 In any event, a plaintiff should not rely on
a mere allegation of recklessness without facts to support that
claim. 30 9 Malice is a question of fact for the jury. 3 10 A failure to
allege the relevant, facts would undoubtedly lead to a denial of
punitive damages.
V. CONCLUSION
As early as 1920 courts awarded punitive damages against a
drunken driver. Presently, the vast majority of courts favor
imposition of punitive damages in drunken driver cases. While
courts in some jurisdictions presume that driving while intoxicated
is a reckless act, other courts place a greater burden upon the
plaintiff to prove his or her case. These courts require that the
plaintiff prove every element of the negligence claim. By requiring
proof of proximate cause and the *defendant's awareness of the
probable consequences of his or her act, courts guard against the
imposition of liability in nonmeritorious cases. These requirements
also shield defendants from becoming insurers in strict liability for
punitive damages. Nevertheless, given the current intolerance for
drunken drivers on our highways, it is likely that courts will be
particularly receptive to a plaintiffs request for punitive damages.
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305. Neidhardt, 103 N.W.2d at 102 (defendant intended to commit the act and knew the act was
wrongful when he acted).
306. Dalen, 314 N.W.2d at 69 (in an assault and battery case, the circumstances included the
swiftness of the attack, profanity, and repeated blows to the plaintiff).
307. See, e.g., Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564, -,
153 N.E.2d 90, 95 (App. Ct. 1958)
(recklessness inferred from improper driving).
308. Id.
309. Cf Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954) (plaintiff failed to allege that
defendant's intoxication caused negligent driving).
310. Dahlen, 314 N.W.2d at 69. The Dahlen court stated, "Malice in fact or actual malice relates
to the actual state of mind of the person who did the act and is a question of fact upon the
circumstances of each particular case to be found by the jury." Id.

